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The discussion of styles of development has been complicated by 
the improper use of this and other associated terms. In order to avoid 
misunderstandings, this article starts by examining the concepts of system 
and structure and on this basis, goes on to define a style of development 
as “the way in which human and material resources are organized and 
assigned within a particular system with the object of solving such questions 
as what goods and services to produce; how; and for whom”. More 
specifically, it notes two sets of features of such styles: (a) those which 
make up the structural basis of the production apparatus, especially the 
sectoral structure of the product and employment, the various technological 
strata, and the predominant type of external relationship, and (b) the 
dynamic elements of the system, which are revealed by analyzing the level 
and composition of demand and its underlying basic factors, namely the 
level and distribution of income. These two sets of features are closely 
linked by a circle of mutual cause and effect.
The article does not limit itself to a conceptual explanation: on the 
basis of statistical data it also describes the prevailing economic styles 
in Latin America, the fundamental problems which beset them, and the 
possible options for solving these.
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In view of the growing interest in “styles of development” 
and the discussions that have arisen about them, there 
is some danger that old discussions and problems may 
be revived under new slogans, adding little of substance 
and perhaps even accentuating misunderstandings or 
serving as the basis for sterile exercises.
Accepting the foregoing and taking it as a 
useful warning should not be carried to the extreme 
of  disparaging the whole subject and the efforts 
that have long been made to elucidate it, however. 
It is a well-known fact that important changes in 
meaning and approach usually begin with what seem 
to be or are considered as purely formal or semantic 
modifications. A case in point is the transition from 
the concept of growth to that of development, where 
the conceptual difference between them took time 
to crystallize. The concept of development has since 
been the subject of continual re-interpretations which 
have still not jelled into a new term that adequately 
expresses them. The only expressions which have so 
far come into general usage are an extension (“social” 
or “integrated” development) and a caricature 
(“developmentalism”) which give little more than the 
restricted or insufficient concept of growth, with some 
additional critical considerations on dependence and 
long-term prospects.2
Be that as it may, the fact is that the term 
“style” is used in very different ways and this leads 
to confusion.
Before attempting or recalling any definition, it 
would seem best to place the subject within a specific 
historical context.
Let us first of all investigate the origins –which, 
incidentally, are relatively recent– of  the interest 
shown in this matter. It is common knowledge that 
the discussion stems from widely differing sources.
In the first place, it derives from the growing 
dissatisfaction with the quality of  life and the 
deterioration of the environment in the industrialized 
or post-industrial societies. The extensive and 
varied literature existing on the subject renders any 
digression in this respect unnecessary.
Secondly, the same and other arguments are 
reproduced to a lesser but definitely growing degree in 
the semi-industrialized economies (in Latin America, 
for example), which are just becoming aware of the 
problems involved in continuing their progress towards 
the point reached by the advanced countries, and are 
beginning to suffer the effects of the process.3
Criticism is also prevalent in many countries 
(mainly in Asia and Africa) which have not reached 
the threshold of the industrial society and in some 
cases are still far from doing so. Here, the discontent 
is fed by a combination of  fairly explicit and 
rationalized elements, such as the discouraging view 
of the Western industrialized model, the idea that this 
pattern threatens or is antagonistic to deep-rooted 
cultural values which are worth preserving, and the 
awareness that the reject scheme is neither feasible 
nor capable of solving their cardinal problems.
In other words, concern about the “style of 
development” is shown by those who are sick and 
tired of the “affluent society”, those who –while half  
way to reaching that state– criticize the presumed 
desirability of that goal and, lastly, those who have 
no desire to reproduce the rejected model or have 
little or no chance of doing so.
The first comment that may be made on this state 
of affairs is that it represents a complete change of 
I
General concepts1
1 In writing this article the studies by Marshall Wolfe and Jorge 
Graciarena which appear in this same publication were also taken 
into account. While it is obviously necessary to integrate the 
various approaches and to forge ahead along those lines, it also 
seems certain that it would be useful to have some division of 
labour in this effort, at least at the present stage of the discussion. 
Accordingly, this article deals mainly with economic approaches, 
and there is therefore no room for disparaging references to 
economism (however broad) or to the sociologism or politicism 
of other approaches.
The information on which this article is based was prepared 
with painstaking care, but also with imagination, by the economist 
Santiago Jadue, of the cepal Economic Development Division.
2 It is worth noting that although developmentalism became the 
facile and favourite target of many authors, few took the trouble 
to investigate and explain its meaning. A conspicuous exception 
is Luciano Marting in Industrializaçao e desenvolvimento, Editora 
Saga, Rio de Janeiro, 1967.
3 The word “advanced” is not used in any ironic sense here, 
since the industrialized economies are undoubtedly advanced in 
terms of the development perspective guiding them and of the 
objective fact that they have achieved a high degree of “freedom 
from want” (actual or potential).
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view compared with past habits. Generally speaking, 
as an international economy and society was gradually 
coming into being, the prevailing criterion was that 
the patterns of evolution and progress for all nations 
should be those established by the more advanced 
and dominant communities, which, in the words of 
the Communist Manifesto, tended to transform the 
world in their own semblance and image.4
Now, however, the discouragement and 
pessimism of some is matched by the hostility and 
resentment of others, despite the irrefutable fact that 
the international economy and the economies of the 
industrialized capitalist countries in particular have 
lived through a quarter century of  uninterrupted 
and exceptional material growth.
In other words, criticisms of the prevailing style 
are emerging and spreading in circumstances notably 
different from those existing at the time of the eclipse 
or decline of other great established orders –the Roman 
Empire, the feudal system, etc. This fact gives the 
present crisis a unique significance which has not been 
properly clarified. Nor, incidentally, is there any real 
basis for the parallels repeatedly drawn between the 
present situation and the depression of the 1930s.
A fact which is less often considered but is 
of  prime importance in the discussion of  these 
concerns is that they and the consequent criticisms 
and reservations are limited to a fairly restricted, 
although broadening, social context. That is to say, 
everywhere the broad masses are excluded from 
the discussion, be they in the central countries, 
the semi-industrialized countries, or those on the 
periphery. What is more, if  their feelings on these 
points could be ascertained, it seems fairly obvious 
that the overwhelming majority would be inclined 
to “suffer” the ills of the affluent consumer society 
rather than remain in their present situation, or, in 
the case of the masses in the central countries, to risk 
all they have so recently and laboriously achieved 
for the sake of  a different and uncertain style or 
mode of development.
Even though it may be open to misunderstanding, 
this point must be emphasized in order both to 
determine the nature and depth of the aforementioned 
concerns and to comprehend the vital importance of 
fully exploring alternative courses that would have the 
support and understanding of the broad masses.
Approaching the matter from a different angle, 
it is quite easy to agree with various writers –among 
them my colleagues Wolfe and Graciarena– about 
the confusion surrounding the terminology and 
concepts used in the discussion. Styles, models, 
systems, structures, patterns, profiles, etc. are either 
currently used as though they were synonymous 
terms, or else the differences between the words 
and their special meanings are not strictly defined. 
I myself, for example, must confess that in a 
preliminary version of this study I used the words 
“system” and “style” indiscriminately.5
I do not think it would be either feasible or 
appropriate to venture a series of tentative definitions of 
each of these and other terms used. Let us instead take 
a different course and endeavour to identify three basic 
concepts which are interlinked in the discussion.
The first is that of  the system, which for our 
purposes and in very general terms we shall associate 
with the two main opposing forms of organization 
coexisting in the world today: capitalism and socialism.6
The basic features of  the two models are 
well known. They differ above all in institutional 
organization and in sociopolitical structure, but 
from the standpoint which interests us here the basic 
contrast is the relative importance of  public and 
private expenditure, in terms of both consumption 
and investment. In the capitalist system, the 
composition and dynamics of demand are primarily 
linked with market forces in the area of  private 
consumption and investment, and with the rate of 
return on the allocation of resources. In the socialist 
system, the main elements are decisions by the 
4 In the introduction to the document entitled “Technical progress 
and socio-economic development in Latin America: General 
analysis and recommendations for a technological policy” (ST/
CEPAL/C.53/L.2, November 1974), this question was referred 
to in the following terms: “It is common knowledge that two 
main currents which appeared and prevailed in the nineteenth 
century and which still reflect rival views today –what we could 
call the liberal and the marxist currents– shared the conviction 
that industrial capitalism would spread urbi et orbi, replicating in 
outline the central economies. Naturally, both outlooks differed 
greatly with respect to the social costs of  transformation and 
its later aims, but both and it is worth repeating, looked to the 
revolution of  production forms and mean –in fact, technical 
progress– to open the way to finding solutions to the material, 
institutional, and cultural impediments which bog down the 
precapitalist communities, or were won over by the preliminary 
phases of the evolution of the system”.
5 A. Pinto, Notas sobre estilos de desarrollo en América Latina 
(CEPAL/DE/DRAFT 103), draft for suggestions and comments, 
December 1973.
6 For the purposes of this study it is not really important that, as 
many contend, in terms of “pure” paradigms neither “capitalists” 
nor “socialists” are actually such.
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State (or the Plan) regarding investment and public 
community consumption.7
In line with this concept and the comments at the 
beginning of this study, it is well known that for some 
people dissatisfaction with and criticism of the existing 
style or situation are merely effects or necessary 
concomitants of the procedures and contradictions of 
the capitalist system. Obviously, this would seem to 
imply, in contrast, that the second system was immune 
from all the problems generated by the first.
Although the reservations and difficulties 
attributable to the two systems are clearly not 
identical,8 the number of  those supporting such 
an extreme over-simplified view has decreased 
considerably. Conversely, there are more and more 
people who think that there are some questions which 
go beyond this dichotomy, e.g., problems of  the 
environment, urban agglomeration, the dissatisfaction 
of youth, etc.
Following a different approach, a second 
important category derives from the classification 
into industrialized countries and under-developed 
or developing countries. The essential difference 
here is in structure and consequently, in manner of 
operation and in place and relationship (dominant 
or subordinate) in the world scheme.
From this standpoint, it seems clear that the 
concern about styles is primarily linked with the 
implications of the industrialized community, both 
when fully arrived at industrialized status and when half  
way there, in both capitalist and socialist systems.
In the developing economies the problems 
are more in the nature of the elementary question 
of  survival, once again in both the capitalist and 
socialist systems. In both these situations, however, 
there is also a common feature, as already indicated: 
the conviction held by some that the continuation 
or reproduction of the developed industrial model 
is undesirable or impracticable, or both.
These perspectives are both relevant for 
purposes of this study and should be combined. We 
thus have, from the outset, a difference of  system 
and another of structure, enabling us to identify four 





As everyone knows and past experience has 
shown, there can be widely differing individual 
situations within these system-structure contexts.
As regards the first group, it is hardly necessary 
to refer to the contrasts in the development and 
present profile of  the industrialized capitalist 
economies such as the United Kingdom, the United 
States, Canada, Denmark, France or Switzerland.
Nor is it necessary to describe the differences 
between the experiences of these countries and those 
of such developing capitalist communities as Greece, 
India, Egypt, Mexico or Nigeria, and between the 
features characterizing the latter countries and 
distinguishing them from one another.
This is also applicable to the socialist world. 
Although they belong to the same “system”, there 
are some notable distinctions, both between the 
more industrialized countries –the Soviet Union, 
Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic– 
and between these countries and China or their sister 
countries in Europe (Bulgaria or Romania).
This is not the time or the place to go more 
deeply into the causes of  these differences. Let 
us merely note that they are influenced by such 
important questions as the quantitative and 
qualitative endowment with material and human 
resources (compare the Soviet Union with China, 
the United States with Japan, India with Brazil, 
Argentina with Mexico, Rumania with Albania, 
etc.); historical and cultural background (old and 
new civilizations); external ties (dominating entities, 
subsidiaries such as the former British dominions 
and former colonies); degree and type of political 
and social organization and participation, etc.
Taking all this into account, and for the 
purposes of this study, the point here is that in these 
contexts of system and structure, owing to a variety 
of significant factors, widely differing specific styles 
manifest at all levels of social life may be discerned 
within each of those broad groups. Later on we shall 
consider the economic meaning of the concept from 
the angle of the situation in Latin America.9
7 In 1970, the Soviet Union spent 23 per cent of  the national 
income on education, health and cultural activities of  various 
kinds. See Y. Komarov, “The service sphere and its structure”, 
Problems of Economics, vol. XVI, N° 3, New York, July 1973.
8 For example, some questions such as unemployment, stability, 
the allocation of resources in accordance with elementary needs, 
etc., are features of the capitalist rather than the socialist system. 
Others, such as the degree of openness and political participation, 
dynamism and technological innovation, etc., are more typical 
of the socialist régimes. 9 See the reasons for this “methodological reduction” in footnote 1.
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From this point of view, therefore, I agree to 
all intents and purposes with one of the definitions 
suggested by J. Graciarena,10 according to which a 
style is “the specific and dynamic modality adopted by 
a system within a particular context and at a particular 
moment in history. On the other hand I disagree 
with his statement that “this proposition relates to a 
structure (or social formation) rather than a style”. 
To my mind, his reference to a “context” should be 
taken precisely to apply to the structural fact of the 
developed-developing complex referred to above.
Within this general meaning of the term there 
are various possibilities regarding the scope and 
content of the propositions with respect to styles.
In the most restricted sense, these possibilities 
take the form of options within an existing system 
and structure, but involving more or less significant 
changes in different directions in the predominant 
style, depending on the prevailing values.
This, in my view, was the main line of  the 
pioneering attempt made by the Venezuelan Centre for 
Development Studies (cendes) under the guidance 
of Oscar Varsavsky, following up work initiated in the 
time of the well-known economist Jorge Ahumada.11 
The three styles discussed in the cendes study 
(“consumer”, “authoritarian” and “creative”) were 
assumed to be compatible with the general framework 
of Venezuelan society. In the words of that study, 
“in the hypotheses used there is no discontinuity 
or sharp change of policy which could bring about 
revolutionary situations or revolts”.
A second possibility is that criticism of  the 
prevailing style and the search for possible alternatives 
involves or requires a change in the basic setting of the 
process. This could mean that it is considered essential 
to change the system, i.e., to replace a capitalist 
system by a socialist system, or viceversa.12
It seems fairly clear that this second possibility 
(and its different combinations) transcends the 
conceptual frontiers of  the term “styles”. On the 
other hand, the first or stricter meaning of  the 
term considerably limits the substance and even the 
attractiveness of the word.
This reflection does not detract from the 
importance of  this approach, and it does help to 
clarify its meaning and place vis-à-vis others relating 
primarily, as noted above, to the institutional or 
political context.
Continuing with this digression, it is useful 
to consider the possible relations between those 
categories or approximations.
Of  course, it is possible to visualize a basic 
situation which hypothetically admits various options 
as regards styles, i.e., to return to Graciarena’s 
definition, one that permits various “specific and 
dynamic modalities” within “a system in a particular 
context at a particular moment in history”.
To illustrate this situation, let us take some 
developed capitalist economies such as the Scandinavian 
countries. It is conceivable that in those and other 
similar countries there may be a fairly broad margin 
for introducing appreciable changes in the prevailing 
style. In fact, several of  them have been adopting 
long-term measures to combat serious problems 
of the industrial civilization, such as pollution and 
urban congestion. In others, such as the United States 
itself, there are also potential conditions for seemingly 
marginal changes which could, however, have a far-
reaching impact on their mode of development. Suffice 
it to consider, for example, the projections of a radical 
change in the system of relative prices as a result of 
the rise in the cost of petroleum, the cheapness of 
which up to 1974 gave a special character to the use 
and allocation of production resources.
Much the same might be said about the situation 
of some developing economies which, either because 
of  their production potential or because of  the 
greater flexibility of  their institutional and social 
frameworks, allow fairly significant changes in their 
style of growth.
The same speculations could be made in the 
light of the particular situations of various countries 
operating under the socialist system.
In other circumstances, however, the radius of 
action is far more limited or simply non-existent, 
so that the possibilities of modifying the prevailing 
style are very remote unless changes take place in 
the institutional and structural base. From this 
point of view, China’s experience is one of the most 
impressive. Few doubt that the change in the political 
system after the war was a key factor in overcoming 
many acute and long-standing problems.
Moreover, China’s rejection of  the classic 
development scheme of  the industrial economies 
10 This does not mean that I reject his other suggestions on the 
subject.
11 See cendes, “Estilos de desarrollo”, in El trimestre económico, 
Nº 144, Fondo de Cultura Económica, Mexico City, October-
December 1969.
12 This calls to mind a widely-published article by P. Sweezy, 
“Transición pacífica del socialismo al capitalismo”, on the 
experience of Yugoslavia.
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has been another major factor in defining its unique 
style, in contrast to the capitalist system and the 
other socialist systems which basically follow the 
industrial community model, although they give it 
their own particular stamp.
Naturally, however, this does not mean that China’s 
experience can be reproduced under other conditions, 
as is sometimes so ingenuously contended.
From the operational standpoint and from that 
of  the real or potential opportunities for change, 
it is imperative to take these different situations 
into account.
From a strictly economic angle, the term “style 
of  development” may be taken to be the way in 
which human and material resources are organized 
and assigned within a particular system with the 
object of solving such questions as what goods and 
services to produce, how, and for whom.
The reciprocal influences between “for whom” 
to produce and “what” to produce are fairly obvious, 
as also are the links between them and the question 
of  “how” to produce. In any case, it may safely 
be assumed that the most important factor in the 
global response to these questions is “for whom” 
to produce. As will readily be understood, it is not 
a case of  absolute options but rather of  relative 
preferences as regards the social distribution of the 
main components of the product: an aspect which can 
be of considerable importance, as we shall see later. 
The tendencies of the production system to benefit 
the social groups in differing proportions should be 
evaluated from an angle which will take into account 
the dynamics of the process: i.e., the fact that it is a 
cumulative phenomenon which gradually strengthens 
the tendencies toward greater or lesser inequality.
From an economic point of view, a style may 
be classified according to two kinds of  closely 
interrelated factors. The first are structural factors, 
which reveal the way in which the production 
apparatus has been organized from the standpoint 
of  the economic resources and the structure of 
supply. It is a static perspective, but of fundamental 
importance since it represents the framework of the 
system at a given moment.
The other class of factors includes those which 
are vital for the operation or dynamics of the system: 
those which “drive” it. They are associated with the 
level and composition of demand and with its basic 
factor, the level and distribution of income.
At the risk of  repetition, emphasis must be 
placed on the interrelationship of  these factors. 
Those which “drive” or infuse dynamism into the 
production structure are obviously conditioned by the 
conformation of that structure, whose relative rigidity 
in the short term has a significant effect on the operation 
of the motive forces. These, in their turn, constantly 
influence the production structure and either favour 
change in it or further accentuate its features.
II
The structural base
The relevant data are presented for Latin America as 
a whole and for two contrasting cases of countries 
which represent variations of  the “general style”, 
mainly on account of the stage of development reached.
Table 1 shows the conformation of the structures 
of  production and employment in the region in 
1970.13 The distinctive features are well known and 
there is no need to dwell on them, except in two 
respects. The first is the still very high participation 
of agricultural employment –a generic sign that the 
development of the forces of production is still at 
an incipient stage– which is ultimately reflected in 
the per capita product or income.14 The prevailing 
style (and its alternatives) rests on this basic reality. 
The second important feature for our purposes is the 
disparity between the shares of the various sectors 
in the product and employment, which is another 
of the factors determining under-development and 
simultaneously influencing the conformation of the 
style of growth.
13 For further information on the subject, see “Trends and 
structures of  the Latin American economy in the 1960s”, 
Economic Survey of  Latin America, 1970 (United Nations 
Publications, Sales Nº: E.72.II.G.1).
14 About 500 dollars in 1970, which is appreciably higher than 
in other developing regions.
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These data permit a first approach to the 
questions of  “what” and “how” to produce. The 
composition of  the product and the levels (and 
disparities) of sectoral productivity indicate the true 
situation in these respects.
Table 1 also includes the figures for two variations 
of the regional situation. The contrast between the 
profiles of  Argentina and Nicaragua is all too 
eloquent, as regards both the sectoral proportions 
and the relationships between employment and 
product. The spectrum of  Argentina is at once 
more “developed” and more “balanced”, this 
latter if  consideration is given to the shares of the 
important agricultural sector. It does, however, 
show marked disparities under the headings of 
“other services” and “manufacturing” in both these 
respects. While employment is shown to be excessive 
in “other services”, the opposite is the case in 
“manufacturing”. In contrast, Nicaragua’s system is 
more “homogeneously under developed”.
The production structure can also be analysed 
from another standpoint, on the basis of technological 
strata, thus revealing the sharp disparities between the 
standards of productivity of economic activities. This, 
of course, represents the much-discussed problem of 
structural heterogeneity, which has a clear influence 
on the questions of “what” to produce, “how” and 
“for whom”.15 Table 2 contains the estimates on 
technological strata for Latin America as a whole, 
for Argentina and for Central America.
Beginning with the overall table for the region, 
it can be seen immediately that while only quite a 
small part of  the population is employed in the 
modern sector (a little more than 12 per cent), this 
sector accounts for more than half  of  the goods 
produced.16 As we shall see later, certain goods 
(and services) which directly or indirectly satisfy 
certain types of demand are produced primarily or 
exclusively by this sector.
The mining and manufacturing sectors are those 
which occupy the most important place in the modern 
area, and particularly the former, because of the big 
exporting establishments so characteristic of it. In 
agriculture, in contrast, the poor absorption of labour 
in its modern sector is very marked and is responsible 
for the disparity among the variables chosen.
At the other end of the scale is the so-called 
primitive sector, which still accounts for more than a 
third of regional employment although its contribution 
to the material product is only 5 per cent.17
TABLE 1
Structure of product and employment, 1970
 Latin America  Argentina Nicaragua
 Structure of  Structure Employed Gross Employed Gross
 employment of  product population domestic population domestic
    product  product
Agriculture, forestry, hunting and fishing 43.7 16.4  15.3 14.8  46.4 29.0
Mining and quarrying 1.2 4.1  0.7 1.8  0.6 1.1
Manufacturing 12.7 24.6  22.1 35.7  12.0 15.9
Construction 6.0 3.5  6.6 5.2  3.7 4.1
Electricity, gas, water and sanitary services 0.5 2.0 { 7.6 9.6 } 0.6 2.4Transport and communications 3.8 6.2     3.4 5.4
Trade and finance 9.0 22.0  15.5 18.7  10.9 19.0
Other services 23.1 21.2  32.2 14.2  22.4 23.1
Total 100.0 100.0  100.0 100.0  100.0 100.0
Source: cepal, on the basis of  official statistics.
15 As regards structural heterogeneity, see Economic Survey of 
Latin America, 1968 (United Nations publication, Sales Nº: 
E.70.II.G.1), and A. Pinto, “Naturaleza e implicaciones de la 
“heterogeneidad estructural” de la América Latina”, El trimestre 
económico, Nº 145, Fondo de Cultura Económica, Mexico City, 
January-March 1970.
16 Services have not been included, owing to the limitations 
attached to the concept of productivity in this respect. However, 
activities in that sector show equal or even greater inequalities. 
Productivity in the modern sector would be equal to average 
productivity in the developed countries, and may be estimated 
at between 12,000 and 15,000 dollars per worker.
17 The primitive sector covers mainly subsistence agricultural 
activities and part of  handicraft production. If  services are 
included, of course, it accounts for a high proportion of unskilled 
workers. Its annual, productivity per worker would probably be 
around 300 to 400 dollars.
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As another look at table 2 shows, a large share 
of agricultural employment (65.5 per cent) and no 
mean proportion of agricultural production (almost 
20 per cent) are associated with the primitive sector. 
It seems clear that this is the source of  a sizeable 
share of  rural self-supply production. This is not 
so in the case of  manufactures, for in this sector 
its share is only about 1.5 per cent of the product, 
although it accounts for almost 18 per cent of 
industrial employment.
The intermediate sector is the most “balanced” 
from the point of view of the employment/product 
ratio.18 This sector accounts for almost half of the 
jobs offered and a little more than 40 per cent of 
the product. It plays a particularly important part 
in manufacturing activities, since it employs 65 per 
cent of the industrial labour force and accounts for 
more than a third of the product. Its share in mining 
production is very small, even though more than a 
third of the workers employed in that activity work 
in this sector. Therefore, of all the sectors considered, 
this one has the worst employment/product ratio.
Study and comparison of  the figures for 
Argentina and Central America show different 
situations and features.
Taking an overall view, it is easy to see the 
great importance of the modern sector in Argentina, 
particularly from the employment figures. The 
respective table for Central America shows a much 
higher degree of  imbalance, for a significantly 
smaller part of the labour force (8 per cent compared 
with a little more than 21 per cent in Argentina) 
produces much of the overall product (42.6 per cent 
compared with 58.6 per cent in Argentina).
Taking the opposite approach, it can be seen 
that in Argentina the primitive sector is of  very 
limited importance, whereas in Central America no 
less than 55 per cent of total employment and 80 
per cent of agricultural employment are accounted 
for by this sector.
This is not the place to go into further detail on 
the structural features of the Latin American economy, 
but this part would be incomplete without reference 
to some aspects of Latin America’s external position 
or its external “relationships”, which are of  great 
importance for the study of development styles.
Reference should be made in particular to the 
openness of  the Latin American economies. This 
shows the extent to which they are part of  the 
scheme of the international division of labour. As 
everyone is aware, the region’s export and import 
coefficients are relatively low:19 a situation for which 
TABLE 2
Latin America: conjectural breakdown of employment and product 
by technological strata at the end of the 1960s
 Latin America Central America Argentina
 Modern Intermediate Primitive Total Modern Intermediate Primitive Total Modern Intermediate Primitive Total
Total Product
 Employment 12.4 47.7 34.3 100 8.1 33.6 55.0 100 21.3 65.8 5.3 100
 Product 53.3 41.6 5.1 100 42.6 48.0 9.4 100 58.6 40.5 0.9 100
Agriculture
 Employment 6.8 27.7 65.5 100 5.0 15.0 80.0 100 25.0 57.0 18.0 100
 Product 47.5 33.2 19.3 100 43.9 30.6 25.5 100 65.1 32.3 2.6 100
Manufacturing
 Employment 17.5 64.9 17.6 100 14.0 57.4 28.6 100 25.6 70.6 3.8 100
 Product 62.5 36.0 1.5 100 63.6 30.4 3.3 100 62.1 37.5 0.4 100
Mining
 Employment 38.0 34.2 27.8 100 20.0 60.0 20.0 100 50.0 40.0 10.0 100
 Product 91.5 7.5 1.0 100 57.2 40.0 2.8 100 77.8 21.6 0.6 100
Source: cepal, La mano de obra y el desarrollo económico de América Latina en los últimos años. E/CN/12/L.1.
18 Thus, of  course, the activities in this sector show a level of 
productivity close to the national average: in absolute terms, 
about 2,500 dollars per worker.
19 For information on this subject see “Tendencias y estructuras 
de la economía latinoamericana”, op. cit.
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the bigger countries are largely responsible, since these 
coefficients range from approximately 10 per cent for 
Brazil, Mexico and Argentina, to more than 30 per 
cent for some Central American economies. The great 
majority of the countries increased these coefficients 
over the past decade, and the region became even 
more open during the first three years of the 1970s.
Other events have led to a sharpening of this 
trend and helped to create a different structural 
situation. During the 1960s, the importance of 
external financing in reducing the ever increasing 
deficit on the trade balance and current account 
increased.20 At the same time, the external 
relationship was also strengthened through the 
constantly increasing importance of  transnational 
enterprises in the economies of the region.21
The changes which occurred in the composition 
of exports and imports are yet another factor.
As regards exports, there was a small but 
noticeable decrease in the degree of concentration 
on the export of primary products in the 1960s,22 
while the share of manufactured products rose.23 It 
should be borne in mind that in 1970 approximately 
36 per cent of the region’s exports of manufactures 
were produced by transnational enterprises.
As regards imports, the most important change, 
although it was not a spectacular one, was the drop 
in the share of consumer goods (from 21 per cent in 
1955 to 16 per cent in 1968) and the corresponding 
increase in capital goods.
Of course, these overall changes for the region 
conceal many national variations. Such variations 
have been much more important in the larger 
economies (Mexico, Brazil and Argentina), but 
similar trends –and therefore the same structural 
adjustments– are to be found in almost all the Latin 
American countries.
Lastly, these countries are heading in several 
basic directions which are of key importance for the 
matter under study. In particular, there is a tendency 
towards the strengthening of  what has come to 
be called the “internationalization” or dependent 
incorporation of the regional economies. This path 
has a few features which are different from those of 
the old model of “outward-looking growth”, since 
emphasis is placed on greater diversification of exports 
and, especially, on the “internalization” and transfer 
through transnational enterprises of production and 
demand patterns (or consumption patterns), forms 
of technical progress, marketing and financing, etc., 
prevailing in the developed capitalist centres.
It is scarcely necessary to stress the enormous 
significance of this process for the development style 
or, looked at from another point of  view, for the 
vital questions of “what”, “how”, and “for whom” 
to produce.
III
The functioning of the style
The dynamics of  the style –that is to say, the 
motivating or change-producing forces which 
accentuate or modify its basic profiles– are just as 
important as its structural base or even more so.
Although there is little information on the 
subject, some figures have been collected here 
on Latin America, and in some cases on specific 
national variants, from which certain major features 
can be seen.
Table 3 shows the growth rates of the principal 
industrial groupings. Subject to a few exceptions 
and reservations, they give us an idea of  the 
20 Total external financing (excluding Venezuela, which is a 
special case) increased from 6,600 million dollars in 1950-1959 
to 13,850 million in 1960-1969 (see “Tendencias y estructuras de 
la economía latinoamericana”, op. cit.).
21 Overall figures are not available tor the percentage of regional 
production or country production accounted for by transnational 
enterprises, but it is easy to show their predominance or even 
monopolistic position in many major lines of durable consumer 
goods (especially motor vehicles) and capital goods.
22 Between 1955 and 1968, the share of the main export product 
dropped from 62 to 50 per cent, while that of  the three mean 
products dropped from 80 to 65 per cent (sea “Tendencias y 
estructuras de la economía latinoamericana”, op. cit.).
23 These represented approximately 2.5 per cent of the total in 
1955. By 1970 the figure was in the region of 10 per cent, and 
they increased in the second half  of the 1960s at a rate of more 
than 20 per cent per year.
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global dynamics, since they reflect indirectly the 
performance of the primary and tertiary sectors.24
A look at the data for the region for the period 
1960-1971 immediately shows that the figures for 
each individual grouping fluctuate considerably with 
respect to the average growth rate of the industries 
as a whole (6.8 per cent). In general terms, the 
rate is lower for the so-called traditional activities, 
where non-durable consumer goods industries 
predominate; it is close to or exceeds the average in 
the case of  intermediate activities, and it more or 
less easily exceeds it in the case of the basic metal 
industries, particularly those connected with heavy 
durable goods: appliances, motor vehicles, etc.
The figures describing trends in Argentina, 
Brazil and Mexico confirm similar tendencies, which 
are less pronounced in the first of  the countries 
mentioned but are particularly marked in Brazil. 
For this country the period 1967-1971 was chosen, 
both because the longer term covers highly dissimilar 
periods, and because these years of  active and 
sustained growth at the end of the decade clearly 
bring out the sources of dynamism of the existing 
style. In the case of Brazil, as we can likewise see 
from table 3, the average overall rate of  12.2 per 
cent is made up of quite a high rate of expansion in 
“traditional” activities (around 7 per cent) –a feature 
which cannot be overlooked– but extraordinarily 
24 The primary sector provides the necessary inputs, while the 
tertiary sector will follow to some extent the expansion of the 
industrial groupings. The inclusion of  primary production for 
direct consumption (after deduction of exports and inputs) would 
TABLE 3
Latin america: growth rates of the manufacturing 
sector by industrial groupings
(Cumulative annual average rate for the period 1960-1971)
 Average Argentina Brasila Mexico
 Latin America
Food, beverages and tobacco  4.8  3.7  7.6  5.8
 Food products except beverages  4.6  3.1  7.9  5.7
 Beverage industries  4.9  5.7  6.3  6.9
 Tobacco industry  4.3  4.9  7.1  4.5
Textiles, wearing apparel and leather industry  4.1  2.0  7.1  7.2
Wood and wood products, including furniture  2.9  3.8    4.8
Paper and paper products; printing and publishing  7.4  5.9  7.5  8.2
Chemicals and chemical, petroleum, coal, rubber,
and plastic products  9.0  7.9  13.1  9.2
 Industrial chemicals { 9.9 } 13.3 { 13.6 } 12.8 Other chemical products    6.6    7.8
 Petroleum refineries { 6.4 } 6.3 { 10.6 }  Petroleum and coal products    15.4    
 Rubber products  7.3  6.9  13.9  6.5
Non-metallic minerals, except petroleum and coal products  7.0  7.1  12.1  8.7
Basic metal industries  8.8  8.7    8.8
Metal products, machinery and equipment  9.5  6.9  13.2  11.9
 Metal products, excluding machinery and equipment  8.3  8.4  18.4  9.0
 Machinery except electrical    5.3  17.9  14.1
 Electrical machinery, apparatus, appliances and supplies  10.4  5.8  12.7  11.5
 Manufacture of  transport equipment  10.2  7.4  23.5  13.1
 Motor vehicles  13.5  10.4    15.4
Other manufacturing industries  8.2  3.0    7.7
 Total manufacturing industries  6.8  5.6  12.2  7.8
Source: cepal, on the basis of  official figures.
a 1967-1971.
strengthen rather than change the sense of the table in question, 
since its rate of growth was lower. On the other hand, the table is 
obviously of less importance for the less industrialized countries, 
where the composition of imports is of greater importance.
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high rates in the basic metal industries, particularly 
as regards heavy durable goods.25
The picture which emerges is not a surprising 
one and it was anticipated or implied by many 
analyses. The usual explanation of these trends is 
also very well known, namely, that they are due 
(almost tautologically) to the different income 
elasticities of the demands for goods and services.
The most important thing to do, however, is to 
ascertain the source of this income elasticity: i.e., to 
determine the groups in which demand originates 
and the size for demand for the different classes 
of  products.
In other words, the unequal rates of  growth 
of the industrial groupings provide an approximate 
indication of the tendencies of the system or style as 
regards what is to be produced. The next question is 
to find out to which groups these efforts are directed, 
since these are the economic mandants in this matter: 
in other words, “for whom” is the system producing 
(primarily or exclusively) the various goods.
In table 4 an attempt is made to provide an 
approximate answer to these questions, bearing in 
mind the participation of the different income strata 
in the total consumption of the main items, listed 
by type –foodstuffs, clothing, housing, services, 
durable goods.
Without going into details, it is nevertheless 
possible to bring out some principal relations.
25 It is essential to make a distinction between activities devoted 
to capital formation and those devoted to the production of 
durable consumer goods (despite all the difficulties that drawing 
such a distinction implies) if  more light is to be thrown on the 
subject. The same could be said of  a breakdown of the items 
of  current consumption into mass consumer goods and other 
types of goods with more limited uses, such as certain food or 
textile products.
TABLE 4
Latin America: share of different population strata in total  
consumption, by type of consumption, around 1970a
 Population strata
Type of  consumption Poorest 20%  Poorest 50% 20% below the Richest 10%
   richest 10%
Food, beverages and tobacco 5 23 29 29
 Meat 2 12 34 41
 Cereals 8 32 24 19
 Other foods 5 25 28 28
 Beverages and tobacco 5 22 29 30
Wearing apparel 2 14 32 42
 Clothing 2 13 32 44
 Footwear 3 16 32 36
Housingb 2 15 29 44
Transport 1 5 25 64
Personal carec 2 15 31 41
Domestic service – 1 16 82
Other personal services 1 4 25 67
Recreation and amusementd – 3 20 75
Durable goods 1 6 26 61
 Motor vehicles (purchase) – 1 13 85
 Houses and apartments (purchase) 2 9 29 54
 Furniture 2 5 16 74
 Electrical and mechanical appliances 1 5 37 50
 Total 3 15 28 43
Source: cepal, estimates based on national surveys.
a Estimated average on the basis of  data from Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Honduras, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru and 
Venezuela.
b Housing includes: rents, textile articles for the home, fuels, electricity, gas, water and household goods.
c Personal care includes: toilet articles, drugs and medicines, medical services, hair dressing and suchlike.
d Recreation and amusement includes: holidays and tourism, recreation, newspapers and magazines, dues to social clubs and suchlike.
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Using the shares of the strata represented by the 
poorest 50 per cent of the population and the 10 per 
cent in the highest income bracket as benchmarks, it is 
immediately obvious that the share of the first group 
is invariably lower than that of the second, except in 
respect of the consumption of cereals, and it becomes 
progressively smaller in respect of dearer goods and 
more skilled and costly services. In contrast, the 10 
per cent of  the population in the highest income 
bracket account for a very large share of  such 
goods as motor vehicles (85 per cent), recreational 
activities (75 per cent), domestic services (82 per 
cent), appliances (50 per cent), clothing (44 per cent), 
meat (40 per cent), housing (44 per cent), etc.
If  we add to the consumption of this bracket 
that of the 20 per cent of the population in the next 
lower income bracket, it will be seen that their joint 
consumption amounts to between 75 and almost 
100 per cent of  the total in a number of  cases, 
particularly those of  the higher-priced durable 
consumer goods.
The figures for Argentina and Honduras (see 
tables 5 and 6) show, as might be expected, less 
marked and more acute versions respectively, of 
the regional table. The share of the upper bracket 
is consistently lower in Argentina, and conversely 
that of the lower half  is consistently higher. From 
the point of view of total consumption, the 30 per 
cent in the highest income bracket account for 56 
per cent of consumption in Argentina as against 73 
per cent in Honduras.
Furthermore, if  we take some key items in 
modern consumption patterns, it will be seen that 
the expenditure of  the poorest 50 per cent of  the 
population on electrical and mechanical appliances 
hardly amounts to 3 per cent of the total in Honduras, 
whereas the corresponding figure for Argentina is 25 
per cent. In the case of motor vehicles, however, the 
TABLE 5
Argentina: share of different population strata in total consumption,
by type of consumption, around 1970
 Population strata
Type of  consumption Poorest 20%  Poorest 50% 20% below the Richest 10%
   richest 10%
Food, beverages and tobacco 9 32 26 21
 Meat 9 33 26 20
 Cereals 11 37 25 18
 Other foods 9 32 26 22
 Beverages and tobacco 7 27 29 23
Wearing apparel 5 20 28 31
 Clothing 4 18 29 34
 Footwear 6 26 28 24
Housinga 8 28 27 26
Transport 3 15 32 40
 Public 5 23 29 29
 Private (operation) 1 7 34 51
Personal careb 8 30 27 27
Domestic service 2 6 26 61
Other personal services 2 13 28 40
Recreation and amusementc 3 14 28 44
Durable goods 2 12 27 47
 Motor vehicles (purchase)  - 5 27 60
 Houses and apartments (purchase) 1 7 29 53
 Furniture 1 6 20 70
 Electrical and mechanical appliances 5 25 26 24
 Total 6 25 27 29
Source: cepal, estimates based on national surveys.
a Housing includes: rents, textile articles for the home, fuels, electricity, gas, water and household goods.
b Personal care includes: toilet articles, drugs and medicines, medical services, hairdressing and suchlike.
c Recreation and amusement includes: holidays and tourism, recreation, newspapers and magazines, dues to social clubs and suchlike.
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poorest half of the population is of little significance 
in Argentina, since the acquisition of such goods is 
concentrated in the highest bracket (60 per cent), 
although of  course, the corresponding figure for 
Honduras is much higher: 94 per cent.
Although they are not strictly comparable, 
the tables on the rates of  expansion of  industrial 
activities and on the social distribution of various 
consumer goods are sufficiently clear and indicative 
to be used as a basis for a well-known assumption: 
that the more dynamic elements of the productive 
apparatus are interrelated and depend mainly, and 
sometimes entirely, on the demand of  the groups 
situated at the peak of the distributive structure. In 
other words, given the level of average income in the 
region and in the individual countries, if  the present 
style of development is to work and progress, then 
income and expenditure must be concentrated in 
those strata, so as to sustain and increase demand 
for the favoured goods and services. If  this is done, 
then the productive apparatus will adjust itself  
primarily to the satisfaction of such demand.
TABLE 6
honduras: share of different population strata in total consumption;
by type of consumption, around 1970
 Population strata
Type of  consumption Poorest 20%  Poorest 50% 20% below the Richest 10%
   richest 10%
Food, beverages and tobacco 6 18 29 35
 Meat 3 9 30 52
 Cereals 9 25 25 25
 Other foods 6 18 30 35
 Beverages and tobacco 7 21 33 27
Wearing apparel 5 13 28 46
 Clothing 5 13 27 47
 Footwear 5 13 30 44
Housinga 4 12 30 46
Transport 2 6 28 60
Personal careb 4 12 30 45
Domestic service  -  - 17 82
Other personal services 2 5 23 67
Recreation and amusementc 1 3 14 81
Durable goods 3 8 23 61
 Motor vehicles (purchase)  -  - 5 94
 Houses and apartments (purchase) 4 12 26 49
 Furniture 3 8 25 58
 Electrical and mechanical appliances 1 3 28 66
 Total 5 14 28 45
Source: cepal, estimates on the basis of  national surveys.
a Housing includes: rents, textile articles for the home, fuels, electricity, gas, water and household goods.
b Personal care includes: toilet articles, drugs and medicines, medical services, hairdressing and suchlike.
c Recreation and amusement includes: holidays and tourism, recreation, newspapers and magazines, dues to social clubs and suchlike.
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The situation described raises a few questions which 
can be put in the form of two alternatives:26
a) the style persists and in time gradually brings 
other social strata into the acquisition of the new 
consumer goods, until their use is widespread;
b) the style persists, but without promoting a steady 
and substantial integration of sizeable groups, 
which continue to be marginal consumers 
of  these goods and, furthermore, remain in 
conditions of poverty as regards the satisfaction 
of their vital needs.
The first option copies the process of the central 
capitalist economies. The differences in this respect 
have been brought out in many studies, and this is 
not the place to repeat them.27 At all events, the 
“special case” of Argentina indicates that large-scale 
marginalizations in not an obligatory feature of the 
Latin American experience (the problem is dealt with 
later at the regional level). However, it is clear that 
a basic question of deadlines is involved. A gradual 
incorporation which might have taken a century or 
many decades in the past in the central economies 
does not seem viable in current circumstances unless 
politico-social restrictions are applied, although this 
latter possibility cannot be overlooked in the light 
of certain regional experiences.
Some of  the remarks made above also hold 
good for evaluating the second option. In this 
option, the prevailing style leaves aside important 
sections of the population located in marginal rural 
areas and on the periphery of the cities, so that in 
absolute and even perhaps in relative terms, the 
number of non-participants remaining in a state of 
abject poverty increases.
Without going into the specific viability of this 
option in the short or long term, it is clear that it is 
not acceptable in terms of the professed values of 
the international community.28
To probe deeper into the subject, some figures 
on income distribution in the region and on the 
changes which have taken place between 1960 and 
1970 may be useful (see table 7). Although the 
documentation is admittedly unsatisfactory, the 
trends and relations which they reveal do seem to 
be close to the facts.
When the information on the participation of 
the various strata in total income is studied, several 
aspects stand out. On one hand, the share of  the 
poorest 20 per cent dropped slightly and that of the 
poorest 50 per cent hardly varied. At the extreme 
–and in contrast to what is usually believed to be the 
case– the strata representing the 10 and 5 per cent 
in the highest income brackets showed a moderate 
drop. There was an increase, however, in the share 
of  the stratum corresponding to the 20 per cent 
immediately below the richest 10 per cent from 24.6 
to 28 per cent. In reality, this last-mentioned group 
and the group corresponding to the 30 per cent 
above the poorest 20 per cent are the only groups 
which improved their relative position.
From these points of view, therefore, it could 
be argued that there is a slight deconcentration of 
income from the social peak to the benefit of  the 
groups in the middle and upper-middle brackets. On 
the other hand, there is the drop in the share of the 
poorest stratum.
The foregoing picture must be completed with 
a view of the absolute magnitudes, which clarifies 
and modifies some of the assumptions made in the 
previous paragraphs.
As may be seen from table 7, per capita income 
in the region is estimated to have increased by some 
27 per cent between 1960 and 1970, which would 
represent 95 dollars at 1960 prices in absolute terms.29 
IV
Some questions and options
26 A further obvious possibility which is particularly applicable 
to the relatively less developed countries, namely, that the style 
does not work, has not been left out through ignorance or 
underestimation, but because it is felt that for these countries 
the external variable is much more important.
27 Among others, see another study by the present author: 
“Concentración del progreso técnico y de sus frutos en el 
desarrollo latinoamericano”, in El trimestre económico, 125, Fondo 
de Cultura Económica, Mexico City, January-March, 1965.
28 See cepal, “Report on a unified approach to development 
analysis and planning. Preliminary report by the Secretary-
General” (revised text of  the Spanish version of  document 
E/CN.5/477 of 25 October 1972, presented at the 23rd Session 
of the United Nations Social Development Committee).
29 Between these years the domestic depreciation of the dollar 
was almost 32 per cent.
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This average or global change meant very different 
things for the different strata. Thus, the smaller 
percentage increases of the two groups in the highest 
income brackets represent absolute improvements 
of 325 dollars for the 5 per cent at the top of the 
income bracket structure and 292 dollars for the top 
10 per cent. For the 20 per cent immediately below 
the top 10 per cent, the big relative increase of 45 
per cent represents 192 dollars in absolute terms, 
which is double the overall gains of all strata taken 
together (95 dollars).
Taking a look at the other levels of  the 
distribution pyramid, the first thing which strikes 
one is the stagnation, at a very low level of income, 
of the poorest 20 per cent. Even the poorest 50 per 
cent only increased their income in absolute terms by 
30 dollars, thus reaching in 1970 a level of barely 122 
dollars per year, and again in this case the increases 
of the group (30 per cent) above the poorest 20 per 
cent must be taken into account.
If  these striking features are examined in the 
light of these notes, it is easy to see their influence 
in the forces behind the system or the style of 
development.
With this in view, calculation has been made 
of the increase in personal income which has taken 
place during this period and which amounts to the 
sum of  25,406 million dollars: an increase of  27 
per cent with respect to 1960. From a limited point 
of view –namely, leaving aside other items such as 
retained profits and government savings– this sum 
represents the principal expansion factor of  the 
market and of overall domestic demand.
How was this greater purchasing power distributed 
among the social strata under consideration?
As the last columns of table 7 show, almost a 
third of the increase (31 per cent) went to the top 
10 per cent, and this share increases to 71 per cent 
if  the following 20 per cent are included.
The poorest half, in contrast, only appears to 
have received a 16 per cent of the total, and almost 
the whole of the poorest 20 per cent at the base of 
the pyramid failed to benefit from this increase.
If  the increase obtained by the next 20 per cent 
is added to that of the strata making up this bottom 
half, the 70 per cent of the population is estimated 
to have had a 29 per cent increase in income: a figure 
which is lower than that received by the richest 10 
per cent (31 per cent).
From another point of  view, considering the 
absolute figures, it may be said that the expansion 
of the market attributable to the highest 30 per cent 
amounted to some 18,000 million dollars and that of 
the remaining 70 per cent to only 7,400 million.
These figures clearly show in which strata the 
income increases in the period under study were 
concentrated, and it is obvious that this trend 
corresponds roughly to that which occurred in the 
allocation of resources –translated, as we have seen, 
into different rates of expansion of the productive 
TABLE 7
Latin America: per capita income in 1960 dollars and changes in the shares
of the different socio-economic strata in total income of the region
Socio-economic strata Share of  each stratum Per capita incomea Rice in per capita Total rise by Rice of  each
 in total income (1960 dollars) income all strata stratum as
 1960 1970 1960 1970 Percentage 1960 (millions of  percentage of
      dollars 1960 dollars) total rise
Poorest 20% 3.1 2.5 53 55 3.8 2 107.6 0.4
Next 30%  10.3 11.4 118 167 41.5 49 3 919 15.4
Poorest 50% 13.4 13.9 92 122 32.6 30 4 025 15.8
Next 20%  14.1 13.9 243 306 25.9 63 3 359 13.2
20% below the top 10%  24.6 28.0 424 616 45.3 192 10 237 40.3
Top 10% 47.9 44.2 1 643 1 945 17.7 292 7 785 30.7
Top 5% 33.4 29.9 2 305 2 630 14.1 325 4 332 17.1
Total 100.0 100.0 345 440 27.5 95 25 406 100.0
Source: cepal, estimates on the basis of  national surveys.
N.B.: The average distribution for Latin America in 1970 was estimated on the basis of  information from Argentina, Brazil, Chile, 
Colombia, Honduras, Mexico, Paraguay and Venezuela.
a Per capita personal income.
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activities. It is worth repeating that “what to 
produce” has had to be brought in line with “for 
whom to produce”.
An even clearer picture can be gained if  we 
look again at the absolute figures for income and 
link them to the main items of  consumption. In 
this respect, and in the light of the figures in table 
7, some reasonable assumptions can be made.
First, it is clear that at the regional level 
approximately one-half  of the population have an 
average per capita income of some 120 dollars per 
year and therefore, have great difficulties in satisfying 
their most elementary needs. Among them, the 
poorest 30 per cent are probably below any “poverty 
line” that could be drawn,30 while the remaining 20 
per cent, whose income approximates to 200 dollars 
per year, are probably situated only just above it.
The upper crust of this sector, together with the 
20 per cent of the population situated immediately 
above it, whose average income is about 300 dollars, 
has surely already entered the market for basic 
low cost industrial products and a range of cheap 
urban services. On the other hand, this group can 
only gain access to durable goods and more skilled 
services at considerable sacrifice, or by reducing 
their consumption of essential goods. Neither the 
shares nor the absolute increases of these strata show 
significant changes at this stage. 
As already stated, it is a very different matter 
when we look at the changes which took place in 
the position of the 20 per cent below the richest 10 
per cent. Both their share and the absolute increase 
in per capita income (approximately 45 per cent over 
the decade, thus raising this stratum above the 600 
dollar mark) are of obvious importance. In fact, this 
stratum absorbed 40 per cent of the overall increase 
in income, amounting to more than 10,000 million 
dollars (see table 7).
It seems reasonable to think that the members 
of  this stratum have crossed the threshold of  the 
market for durable goods. If  we take another look 
at table 4 it will be seen that this group accounts 
for 37 per cent of the consumption of electrical and 
mechanical appliances, 30 per cent of the purchases 
of housing and related expenditure, 32 per cent of 
the consumption of  footwear and clothing, etc. 
However, their access to more expensive durable 
goods such as motor vehicles (only 13 per cent) is 
still limited, although their participation in the used 
car market is probably increasing steadily.31
Without repeating what has been said about the 
highest strata in the system, some of the assumptions 
made may be reviewed.
On one hand, the concentrating bias of  the 
prevailing style is beyond doubt and is clearly seen 
from the increases in per capita income, in absolute 
income, and in market potential. From this point 
of view it appears obvious that there is a circle of 
cumulative causality, in that this bias in income 
distribution influences the orientation of the productive 
system and strengthens or entrenches a given supply 
structure. Such a structure, in its turn, calls for a 
corresponding distribution scheme. In view of the 
level of average income and the social destination of 
the most dynamic lines of production, this scheme 
will inevitably tend towards the concentration of 
income, thus completing the circle.
On the other hand, however, this style seems 
less exclusive than is sometimes argued. Available 
data suggest that it has succeeded in widening its 
supporting base in the upper-middle levels (the 20 
per cent below the top 10 per cent) and that it has 
even brought about positive changes in the better-
placed sectors of the poorest half of the population, 
although in absolute terms their incomes continue 
to be very low (see table 7).
The third aspect worthy of  consideration is 
the obvious marginalization and deplorable living 
conditions of a fair part of the population –at least a 
third– which is undoubtedly situated below the abject 
poverty line. This gives rise to the basic question as to 
the value of the prevailing style, in other words, whether 
its functioning offers possibilities or not for raising 
substantially, within a reasonable period of time, the 
standard of living of those suffering from the highest 
degree of ethical, social, and political deprivation.30 The average income of  this 30 per cent of  the population 
probably hardly exceeds some 70 dollars. The Economic 
Development Division of cepal is working on the identification, 
from different points of view, of “the poor of Latin America”, 
by country, activities, rural/urban distribution, etc. It may be 
noted that in some studies the “poverty line” is set as low as 50 
dollars per capita per year. See Redistribution with growth: An 
approach to policy by the Institute of  Development Studies of 
the University of Sussex and the Development Research Centre, 
World Bank, Washington, D.C., August 1973.
31 In Argentina, their share in the purchase of motor vehicles is 27 
per cent; in Honduras, it is only 5 per cent. See tables 5 and 6.
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Before going into the possibilities which the 
prevailing style offers for tackling the problem of 
abject poverty, an approximate idea of what the term 
means may be useful. In order to gain such an idea, 
a study has been made of the regional situation as 
regards some basic consumer goods –foodstuffs 
(meat, cereals and others) and clothing (including 
footwear)– and this situation has been compared 
with the average levels obtained in Argentina.
As may be seen from table 8, the standards of 
consumption of  at least 70 per cent of  the Latin 
American population differ greatly from the figures for 
Argentina, except in respect of cereals, where the figures 
reflect the unbalanced diet prevailing in large sectors 
of the region. In contrast, the consumption figures 
for the third stratum (the 20 per cent in the income
bracket immediately below the top 10 per cent) are close
to the Argentine average, and those of the group in 
the highest income bracket considerably surpass it.
Table 9 continues the exercise of appraising the 
magnitude of the increases which would be necessary 
to reach the levels of Argentina and of establishing 
V
The meaning of critical poverty
TABLE 8
Per capita consumption of food, clothing and footwear in Argentina
and in the different population strata of Latin America, 1970
(1960 dollars per capita)
 Latin America
 Argentina Poorest 20% Next 50%  20% below the  Richest 10%
    richest 10%
Food 317 42 133 251 515
 Meal 81 4 19 71 172
 Cereals 29 16 39 47 74
 Other 207 22 74 133 269
Wearing apparel 93 6 25 85 221
 Clothing 69 4 17 63 172
 Footwear 24 2 8 22 49
Source: cepal, estimates on the basis of  national surveys.
TABLE 9
Latin America: increases in food, clothing and footwear needed to achieve
per capita consumption of such articles at least equal to average consumption
of them in Argentina in 1970
 Necessary percentage  Share of  total increase corresponding 
 increases over present to the different population strata
 availability of  each item
 Poorest 20% Next 50%  20% below the  Richest 10% 
   richest 10%
Food 90.9 34.3 57.4 8.3 –
 Meal 118.1 32.9 61.0 6.1 –
 Cereals -15.6 43.0 -85.0 -58.0 –
 Other 125.4 31.2 56.4 12.5 –
Wearing apparel 99.0 32.9 64.1 3.0 –
 Clothing 101.7 32.3 64.5 3.2 –
 Footwear 91.1 34.7 62.5 2.8 –
Source: cepal, estimates on the basis of  national surveys.
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in what proportion they should be distributed among 
the groups for each group to attain this objective.
The size of the increases needed is immediately 
obvious; except in the case of cereals, the consumption 
of the different items would have to double or nearly 
so. It goes without saying that the greatest increases 
would have to be concentrated in the poorest 20 
per cent.
The next 50 per cent would also have to receive 
a somewhat higher share than that corresponding to 
their share of the population, however, particularly 
as regards clothing and footwear.
Lastly, table 10 shows the rates of growth which 
would have to be attained over different periods of time 
(five, ten and fifteen years) for the population of the 
region to reach the levels of consumption desired.
Undoubtedly the effort required is a big one. 
In order to attain the objective in question within 
a period of five years, expansion rates beyond the 
possibility of any system would be required, and even 
if this period were extended to ten years, considerable 
strain would be put on the productive system.32
These growth requirements, which are far from 
encouraging any simplistic optimism, are associated 
with urgent needs in other fields of major importance 
to social welfare, such as health, education and 
other community services, which also call for huge 
resources if  the situation of abject poverty is to be 
radically changed.
At the same time, to put things on a realistic 
plane, it should be realized that the average levels 
of  consumption in Argentina are very high, both 
compared with those prevailing in the region 
and also compared with hypothetical subsistence 
consumption targets.
According to a recent study,33 if  these targets 
are to be achieved and abject poverty eliminated, 
the lowest income of the poorest 50 per cent of the 
Latin American population should be at least 238 
dollars (at 1970 prices) per capita per year: a sum 
which would enable this stratum of the population 
to satisfy their minimum needs of clothing and food. 
Around 1970, actual income was 73 dollars per year 
for the poorest 30 per cent of the population and 
122 dollars for the poorest 50 per cent.
In view of the foregoing, table 10 was prepared, 
which shows the per capita income of the different 
strata in 1970, with projections for 1980, the target 
being to raise minimum per capita income to at 
least 238 dollars per year. In order to make the 
outlooks clearer, two hypotheses were made. The 
first assumes a modification of the 1970 distribution 
structure, whereas the second assumes no change in 
the structure.
In the first case, in order to achieve the desired 
consumption with a rate of increase of average per 
capita income of  3 per cent per year –similar to 
the rate recorded in the 1960s– the income of the 
poorest 30 per cent of the region’s population would 
have to increase at a rate of 12.5 per cent per year, 
while for the poorest 50 per cent the rate of increase 
would have to be 6.9 per cent. For this to be possible, 
the relative shares of each stratum in total income 
would have to be changed.34 As may be seen from 
section IV of table 11, this would involve only quite 
modest changes in the shares of the sectors situated 
in the upper half  of the distribution pyramid, and 
these would moreover be compatible with absolute 
Table 10
Latin America: annual accumulative growth 
rates of food, clothing and footwear 
production necessary for the region to achieve 
within five, ten and fifteen years a minimum 
per capita consumption of such articles equal 
to the average for Argentina in 1970
 5 years 10 years 15 years
Food 16.7 9.6 7.3
 Meal 19.8 11.0 8.2
 Cereals -0.4 1.2 1.8
 Other 20.5 11.4 8.5
Wearing apparel 17.6 10.0 7.6
 Clothing 18.0 10.2 7.7
 Footwear 16.7 9.6 7.3
Source: cepal, estimate on the basis of  national surveys.
N.B.: These rates were calculated on the assumption of a 2.9 per 
cent annual increase in the population of  Latin America.
32 On this point, see table 3 and in particular the growth rates of 
traditional industries in Brazil. Even bearing in mind that these 
also include goods consumed above all by high-income groups, 
at existing expansion rates it would take more than 15 years to 
reach the levels indicated.
33 See “La alimentación en América Latina dentro del contexto 
económico regional y mundial”, (preliminary version), a 
document prepared by the cepal/fao Joint Agriculture Division 
for the thirteenth fao Regional Conference for Latin America, 
August 1974.
34 It should be borne in mind that such changes would not 
necessarily mean monetary transfers from one group to another. 
They could also be brought about through material transfers 
financed, of course, through fiscal and monetary channels.
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increases in their income between 1970 and 1980. 
Thus, for example, although the share of the richest 
10 per cent of  the population would drop from a 
little more than 44 per cent to 41 per cent, their 
income would increase from 1,945 dollars in 1970 
to 2,424 in 1980.
The situation is different if  we assume that the 
1970 distribution structure is to be maintained, as 
assumed in the second hypothesis. In this case, for 
the poorest 50 per cent to reach the minimum level 
established, per capita income would have to increase 
annually by almost 7 per cent –more than double 
the historical rate– which is of  course beyond the 
realm of reasonable possibility.
In other words, if  an objective more modest 
than that indicated in the previous exercise is 
fixed, the target aimed at would not be excessively 
ambitious if  in one way or another an appreciable 
but not radical transformation could be made in 
the distribution structure. Although this is not the 
place to develop this subject, it should be noted that 
the foregoing clearly shows that, as far as average 
per capita income is concerned, the elimination 
or substantial reduction of abject poverty is not a 
utopian ideal. And it is even less so if  the problem is 
looked at from a realistic point of view, i.e., bearing 
in mind the degree of development of the production 
potential and the different possibilities of using and 
allocating such potential.
At all events, however, the problem cannot 
be solved without a considerable mobilization and 
reallocation of human and material resources.
TABLE 11
Latin America: per capita income by strata in 1970 and projections for 1980 on the 
assumption that minimum per capita income will reach at least 238 dollars per year, 
which is the average per capita spending on food and clothing of the 30 per cent of 
the population with incomes higher than the mean
(1960 dollars and annual growth rates)
 I II III IV
 Per capita  Hypothesis I Hypothesis II Percentage share of  each
 income 3% annual increase in Retaining the 1970 stratum in total income 
 in 1970 the average per capita  distribution structure
  income of  the region
 Per capita  Annual rate  Per capita  Annual rate  Hypothesis I Hypothesis II
 income 1970 - 1980 income 1970 - 1980
First 30% 73 238 12.5 238 12.5 12.0 8.3
First 50% 122 238 6.9 238 6.9 20.1 13.9
Next 20% 306 381 2.2 595 6.9 12.9 13.9
20% before
  the top 10%  616 767 2.2 1 200 6.9 26.0 28.0
Top 10% 1 945 2 424 2.2 3 794 6.9 41.0 44.2
Top 5%  23 630 3 277 2.2 5 130 6.9 27.7 29.9
Total 440 591 3.0 860 6.9 100.0 100.0
Source: Column I cepal, estimate on the basis of  national surveys.
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VI
options
The above statement is confirmed to some extent 
by the exercises which have been carried out using a 
numerical model in a joint project undertaken by the 
Economic Development Division and the Economic 
Projections Centre of cepal.35
On the basis of the prevailing growth style, a 
fairly dynamic rate of  expansion (7 per cent per 
year), and a background typical of  an economy 
similar to that of  Brazil (and to some extent, 
therefore, of the region as a whole), an attempt has 
been made to show what would occur towards the 
end of the century as regards some basic features, 
among them employment and income distribution, 
which are closely interrelated.
As far as employment is concerned, the 
proportion of the labour force which is unemployed 
or employed in backward strata (the primitive 
stratum and the lower part of  the intermediate 
stratum) would drop from 53 to about 45 per cent 
between 1970 and the end of the century, although 
its size in absolute terms would double. The 
composition of this group would undergo a marked 
change, becoming more urban than rural.
The consequent differences in productivity 
would become more pronounced, and by the end of 
the period productivity in agriculture and traditional 
services would only amount to a quarter of  the 
national average and a much smaller fraction of the 
productivity of the modern stratum.
This concentration of technical progress (and its 
effect the absolute or substantial marginalization of 
a large sector of the system) is matched symetrically 
as regards the distribution of its fruits.
As indicated in a study quoted earlier,36 “the 
insight into the distribution of income which can be 
obtained from the model follows directly from the 
employment structure and its evolution... There is 
some improvement, but the basic imbalance remains. 
By the end of the century there has been some upward 
shift in the relative composition of the labour force: 
the low income group declines to less than half of the 
total, the middle group is marginally larger and the 
high income group is considerably larger, accounting 
for about one sixth of all income recipients”.
Thus, the point raised previously crops up 
once again: namely that while the style admits of 
or involves a certain degree of  “deconcentration” 
or “levelling up”, it involves above all the absolute 
or considerable marginalization of  an appreciable 
proportion of the “poorest half”.
In order to define the foregoing aspects more 
clearly, a summary exercise was carried out which 
appears in table 12. Here, two hypotheses are put 
forward with respect to policies which might be 
proposed for reducing the degree of heterogeneity 
of production characteristic of the Latin American 
structure or, looked at from the opposite point of 
view, for promoting a definite movement towards 
the homogenization of  that structure. For this 
purpose a long-term view is taken from 1970 to 
the year 2000.
The first hypothesis is the more radical. It 
involves the disappearance of  the primitive or 
subsistence stratum and the reduction of  the 
intermediate stratum. In this way, the share of the 
modern stratum in employment would increase 
from 15 to 70 per cent, while the proportion of the 
production of the product generated by this stratum 
would increase from 57 to almost 76 per cent. The 
economy in question would therefore show a very 
high level of  homogeneity and modernization by 
about the year 2000. For this to be possible, the 
overall economy and the modem stratum would 
have to grow rapidly (at rates of 7 and 8 per cent, 
respectively) and the average productivity of  the 
modern stratum would continue to be that of 1970, 
although the average productivity of the system as a 
whole would increase by 4.4 per cent per year.
Obviously, this picture is very different from 
the real possibilities. At the same time, it should be 
borne in mind that, even in this extreme or utopian 
version, it does not involve, as has sometimes been 
thought, any suggestion of a technological holdup 
or freeze, since the productivity of  the economy 
35 See in particular cepal, Un modelo para comparar estilos de 
desarrollo o políticas económicas optativas, E/CN.12/907, 1971 and 
“Different development models or styles”, Economic Bulletin for 
Latin America, Vol. XIX, Nos. 1 and 2, 1974, United Nations 
publication, Sales Nº: E. 75.II.G.2.
36 “Different development models or styles”, op. cit., pages 45 
and 46.
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as a whole increases, as we have seen, at the very 
high rate of  4.4 per cent. Moreover, as far as the 
modern stratum is concerned, the fact that its 
average productivity would be maintained does not 
exclude the possibility that within this unchanging 
global level there could be branches or enterprises 
which would increase their efficiency at much more 
rapid rates: even at rates more rapid than that of 
the growth of the overall economy.
The second hypothesis postulates more 
moderate changes. It assumes that in the year 2000 
the subsistence stratum will still contain almost 5 
per cent of the active population, but thanks to the 
decrease in its size, its per capita product will have 
increased from some 200 to some 900 dollars per 
year. The intermediate stratum, for its part, would 
have a greater role to play in absorbing some of 
those displaced from the subsistence economy. Thus, 
as is evident, the modern stratum would become 
more important as a source of  employment and 
would also have a greater possibility of increasing 
both its average productivity (1 per cent per year) 
and that of top priority branches or enterprises.
These exercises, it must be stressed, are neither 
prophecies nor programmes. Between them and the 
concrete reality of the near and more distant future 
stand the actions of society (on both the domestic 
and external levels) and, from a more specific point 
of view, the economic and social policies followed. 
In other words, they are and will be only as valid 
as the assumptions on which they are based, which 
are by definition changeable.
TABLE 12
Latin America: projection of productivity sectors to the year 2000,
on the basis of a trend towards greater homogeneity in the economy
 Percentage structure Product per  Annual average growth rates
  employed person (1970-2000)
 Employment Product (1960 dollars)
 1970 2000 1970 2000 1970 2000 Employment Product Product
         worker
Hypothesis A
 Primitive sector 35 – 4.7 – 210 – – – –
 Intermediate sector 50 30 38.1 24.3 1 200 4 400 1.0 5.4 4.4
 Modern sector 15 70 57.2 75.7 6 000 6 000 8.0 8.0 0.0
 Whole economy 100 100 100.0 100.0 1 500 5 500 2.6 7.0 4.4
Hypothesis B
 Primitive sector 35 9 4.7 1.5 210 900 -2.0 3.0 5.0
 Intermediate sector 50 37 38.1 24.4 1 200 3 900 1.5 5.5 4.0
 Modern sector 15 54 57.2 74.1 6 000 7 700 7.0 8.0 1.0
 Whole economy 100 100 100.0 100.0 1 500 5 500 2.6 7.0 4.4
N.B: In hypothesis A the primitive sector is absorbed by the modern sector, whose labour force increase by 8% annually while its 
product per person employed remains unchanged.
VII
Some vital questions
In any event –going back to the initial theme– this 
discussion leads us inevitably to the essential question 
of the possibility of introducing the changes which are 
considered to be desirable, necessary and historically 
viable in the light of  material circumstances and 
within a given period of time. Put in other words, 
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closer to those used in the discussions we all know 
so well: Is it a question of  changing the style of  
development or must the system also be changed.37
It is clear that we cannot provide an answer 
to the question. Further, we do not believe that 
there can be any answer which is valid for all times 
and places and which does not specify the concrete 
terms in which it holds good. From this point of 
view it seems obvious that, while certain changes 
in a prevailing style may imply or require radical 
changes in institutional and political parameters 
–i.e., in the system– there are others which fit within 
an existing framework, although they will always call 
for some review and adjustment of it. The historical 
experience to which we referred in the first section 
provides many different examples of this.
Furthermore, the same experience also shows us 
that replacing one system by another does not mean 
the disappearance of all the problems of the former 
style, although it can indeed bring new ones with 
it, to the distress of  “utopian ideology”. But this 
alone does not disprove the need for or advisability 
of such a change.
From a more specific point of view, and thinking 
of Latin America and its problems, I would make so 
bold as to argue, for example, that there are a number of 
countries which could eliminate or substantially mitigate 
abject poverty within a reasonable period of time, without 
a total transformation of the existing system being 
necessary, although it would of course have to undergo 
marked changes in its structure and operation.
The situation of other countries is different, but 
even in respect of these it should be borne in mind 
that in quite a few cases the problem is not just that of 
changing the system but also of dealing with aspects 
of major importance or complexity regarding such 
matters as resource endowment, economic size, native 
cultures which are difficult to “modernize” or activate 
in the context of traditional structures, etc.
In the final analysis, only by trial and error will 
it be possible to find the answers to each situation 
and to each desired change in the existing style.
37 For a different approach, but one which is still relevant to these 
problems, see the author’s study Inflación: raíces estructurales, and 
particularly the article “Heterogeneidad estructural y modelos de 
desarrollo reciente de la América Latina” (pp. 104 and following), 
Fondo de Cultura Económica, Mexico City, 1973. See also the 
study by A. Pinto and A. Di Filippo, “Nota sobre la estrategia de 
la distribución y la redistribución del ingreso en América Latina”, 
in Distribución del ingreso by Alejandro Foxley (compiler), Fondo 
de Cultura Económica, Mexico City, first edition, 1974.
